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The Mental Capacity Act 2005 came into force in England and Wales in 2007. Its
primary purpose is to provide ‘‘a statutory framework to empower and protect
people who may lack capacity to make some decisions for themselves.’’1 Examples
of such people are those with dementia, learning disabilities, mental health
problems, and so on.2 The Act also gives those who currently have capacity a legal
framework within which they can make arrangements for a time when they may
come to lack it. Toward this end, it allows for them to make advance decisions (in
effect, refusals of consent to certain forms of treatment) or to appoint proxy
decision makers with lasting powers of attorney. Such attorneys must always act
with regard to the incapacitated person’s best interests. Of course, where no such
arrangements have been put in place, the Act insists that all decisions made on
behalf of an incapacitated person, such as those made by healthcare professionals,
must also be carried out in her best interests. In cases in which there is
disagreement about precisely what constitutes those interests or where clarifica-
tion of the legality of a proposed course of action is needed, a newly instituted
Court of Protection is empowered to make the required judgments. The court may
also appoint a deputy to make decisions on the incapacitated person’s behalf.
Although much commented upon, the Act has until recently received com-
paratively little in the way of distinctively philosophical attention. This is in some
ways surprising, especially because, as will become clear, it has at its heart
a distinctive notion of decisionmaking capacity that is likely to be of some interest
to bioethicists. In this short report, I outline and briefly comment on the Act’s
central principles before summarizing some recent original work on the Act that
has been carried out by colleagues from my own organization, the International
School for Communities, Rights and Inclusion at the University of Central
Lancashire.
The Mental Capacity Act 2005: Key Principles
In the very first paragraph of the Act, five key principles are listed, which are to
be taken as underpinning and guiding all its provisions:
1) A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he
lacks capacity.
2) A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all
practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without success.
3) A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he
makes an unwise decision.
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4) An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person
who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests.
5) Before the act is done, or the decision is made, regard must be had to
whether the purpose for which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in
a way that is less restrictive of the person’s rights and freedom of action.3
The first principle, which we might call the principle of the presumption of
capacity, aims to avoid anybody’s being taken to lack capacity in certain areas of
decisionmaking, simply because of her age, appearance, physical or mental
condition, and so on.4 The Act emphasizes, too, that capacity or its lack is, so to
speak, decision-context dependent: a person’s lacking the capacity to make
decisions of one type does not entail that she lacks the capacity to make decisions
of another type. It may also be that the capacity to make one specific type of
decision is subject to fluctuation over time; under certain circumstances, a person
may be perfectly capable of making a type of decision that, under other
circumstances, she would not be able to make. This stress on the decision-context
dependence of capacity and the consequent shift from characterizing individuals
as capable or incapable tout court would appear to have much in common with
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’s belief that it is more useful in biomedical
ethics to talk of the autonomy or otherwise of acts, rather than of persons:
Even autonomous persons who have self-governing capacities . . .
sometimes fail to govern themselves in particular choices because of
temporary constraints caused by illness, depression, ignorance [and so
forth]. . . . Similarly, some persons who are generally incapable of
autonomous decision making can at times make autonomous choices.5
Therefore, whenever the Act makes use of the notion of a person’s lack of
capacity, that lack should be understood as existing relative to particular types of
decision in particular contexts only. And, it is clear, given the first of the five
principles, that no judgment of such a lack can legitimately be made in the
absence of a proper assessment of a person’s capacity.
What is more, as the third principle makes clear, we are not to assume that
a person lacks the capacity to make a certain type of decision just because she
makes a decision of that type that is unwise. Clearly, this principle acts as a check
on paternalism. Equally clearly, it mirrors the distinction between substantive
autonomy (determined by reference to the output of a piece of practical reasoning,
i.e., by reference to the decision itself) and procedural autonomy (determined by
reference to the nature of the reasoning that underlies a decision).
Though I have not seen this concern raised anywhere, it seems to me that there
may be some tension between the fourth and the fifth principles. If both are to be
followed, then when someone needs to make a decision for an incapacitated
patient (perhaps an agent to whom has been granted lasting powers of attorney,
perhaps a deputy appointed by the Court of Protection, or perhaps a healthcare
professional charged with the care of a patient), that decision must both be
concerned with the patient’s best interests and be the least restrictive possible of
the person’s rights and freedoms. However, it seems conceivable that some proxy
decisions that are in a patient’s best interests may not be the least restrictive
possible; conversely, the decision that is least restrictive in a particular circumstance
Capacity and Consent in England and Wales
345
might fail to be in the patient’s best interests. For situations such as these, we need
to know whether it is the patient’s best interests or her rights and freedoms that
ought to be given greater weight and so which ought to act as a constraint on the
other. Do we decide first what is in her best interests and then choose the available
course of action, out of those in her best interests, which is least restrictive? Or do
we decide first what course of action is least restrictive and then act not in the
patient’s overall best interests but in her best interests compatible with, and limited
by, a recognition of her rights and freedoms?
Having said that, the conception of best interests appealed to in the Act
appears to differ in some ways from that most commonly employed in, for
example, the bioethical literature. So, in Part 1, Section 4 of the Act we read that in
considering an incapacitated person’s best interests, someone making decisions
on his behalf must consider, insofar as it is possible,
a) the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any
relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity),
b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had
capacity, and
c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.6
Now, suppose that we are reasonably certain that the incapacitated person
would, had he possessed capacity, have made an unwise decision. This account
of best interests seems to license us to make an unwise decision on his behalf.
And yet an unwise decision is usually understood precisely as being one which
runs counter to the decision maker’s best interests. It may seem odd, then, to
hold, as the Act implicitly does, that just such a decision can be in the patient’s
best interests. In fact, it simply demonstrates that the Act’s understanding of the
notion of best interests is a slightly idiosyncratic one, insofar as it covers acts that
would typically be taken to be against a patient’s best interests.
It might be argued that, though potentially confusing in its divergence from
standard usage, the Act’s understanding of best interests is nonetheless perfectly
innocuous. And this may well be the case, so long as the idiosyncratic usage is
borne carefully in mind. Even so, dangers lurk in any attempt to collapse respect
for patient autonomy (or, in this case, a simulacrum of respect for autonomy, as
the patient lacks autonomy in the relevant sphere) into a concern with a patient’s
best interests. The collapse remains safe so long as judgments about what is good
for the patient are subordinated to a determination to do what she would herself
choose. But if the collapse is, so to speak, effected in the opposite direction, so
that what she would choose is understood solely in terms of what is good for
her—and so in terms of her best interests as traditionally understood—then the
specter of paternalism begins to loom.
The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards
To close what has come to be known as ‘‘the Bournewood gap,’’ the Act was
augmented by the specification, in the Mental Health Act 2007, of a range of
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS). The Bournewood gap is a legal
loophole that has allowed incapacitated but compliant patients to be informally
admitted to settings such as hospitals or care homes. Such patients, being
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compliant, have made no attempt to resist admission or to leave settings once
admitted.
One such patient, a severely autistic man known as HL, was admitted to
Bournewood hospital in the early 2000s. Given his compliance, there was held to
be no need formally to detain him under the Mental Health Act, which allows
patients who constitute a risk to themselves or others to be detained against their
wishes. HL expressed no desire to leave, but, crucially, had he tried to, he would
have been prevented. It was this fact that led eventually (after some legal
wrangling in the U.K. courts) to the European Court of Human Rights declaring
the deprivation of HL’s liberty to constitute a violation of his human rights,
despite its being instituted in his best interests (and note that the expression ‘‘best
interests’’ has here its customary sense). It was this ruling that led eventually to
the development of the DoLS.
The safeguards, and the procedures that are triggered in accordance with them
whenever it is deemed necessary to deprive a patient of his or her liberty, are
complex and elaborate.7 Their aim, however, is to provide a legal framework
wherein, among other things, it is possible to appeal against decisions to treat
incapacitated but compliant patients and to ensure that the patients in question
really do lack capacity to decide whether they are to stay in a setting or not.
The Mental Capacity Act and Cultural Sensitivity
Having outlined some of the main points of the Mental Capacity Act and the
DoLS, I want in the remaining sections to consider, all too briefly, some of the
critical evaluation to which colleagues in the International School for Commu-
nities, Rights and Inclusion have subjected them.
One of the main constituencies to which the Mental Capacity Act applies is that
of elderly sufferers from dementia. In England and Wales, a not inconsiderable
proportion of such sufferers will be members of Black and minority ethnic (BME)
groups. In an editorial in the journal Age and Ageing, Ajit Shah (himself a con-
sultant psychiatrist) and Chris Heginbotham have noted some important im-
plications that this fact has for the practical application of the Act. Chiefly, these
concern the ways in which the decisionmaking capacity of some BME elders is to
be assessed. For example, as Shah and Heginbotham point out:
A successful assessment of the DMC [decisionmaking capacity] and the
application of the MCA [Mental Capacity Act] are contingent upon the
assessor’s fluency in the subject’s language, subject’s fluency in English,
accuracy of interpretation services and availability of appropriate
vocabulary in the subject’s language for concepts discussed during the
assessment.8
Where it is necessary to utilize interpreters in an assessment of capacity, Shah and
Heginbotham note that it is important to use professionals; lay interpreters
(members of the patient’s family, for example) may be emotionally involved with
the person being assessed and, consequently, prone to bias. That bias, in turn,
would be liable to infect their translations. But finding a suitable professional
may, it is implied, be no easy matter. For example, different dialects of one and
the same language may be spoken by members of different ethnic groups. In
addition, the gender of the interpreter will be of significance for some BME
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groups—elderly Indian women, for example, may require a female translator if
they are reliably to supply sufficient information to allow for accurate assessment
of their capacity.
The clearing of certain linguistic hurdles is not the only challenge facing those
who would assess the capacity of BME elders, however. Wider cultural factors
will need to be taken into consideration as well:
For example, elders practicing Hinduism and Jainism are expected to
disengage from economic, social and domestic responsibility and,
therefore, may indicate that any decision should be made by their eldest
son. Also, elderly Indian women, in accordance with traditional cultural
practice, may indicate that any decision should be made by their
husband.9
The difficulty in this sort of case, according to Shah and Heginbotham, is that the
Mental Capacity Act does not allow adult subjects to have other people consent
on their behalf.
The general conclusion to which the authors come in their short piece is that
‘‘Policy-makers, service commissioners, service providers and assessors should
be aware of these potential difficulties, and undertake measures to reduce
them.’’10 This is doubtless true, though, perhaps because of restrictions of space,
Shah and Heginbotham do not dwell on the fact that they appear to have
identified two very different types of difficulty in the application of the Act to
BME elders. First, there are those difficulties that—despite practical implications
of resourcing and so on—can, in principle, be met within the terms of the Act.
Into this category fall the potential obstacles created by, so to speak, the existence
of a linguistic gap between assessor and assessed. Second, however, are
difficulties that the Act seems straightforwardly unable to accommodate. Let
us assume that one can make an autonomous choice to hand over responsibility
for decisionmaking to one’s eldest son or one’s husband and in doing so be acting
with full decisionmaking capacity. It would appear that the Act quite simply
neglects to recognize such autonomous acts, which effectively are intended to
create a lasting power of attorney for a person while she retains capacity. If that is
so, then in order for an autonomous decision of this sort to bear fruit, and so in
order for the autonomous agent to get what she wants, she will first have to
convince an assessor that she lacks capacity and thereby autonomy. Only then
will others be allowed to make decisions on her behalf.
Assessment of Capacity and the DoLS
Ajit Shah returns to the topic of the Mental Capacity Act in a number of papers,
including one that addresses what he calls the paradox of the assessment of
capacity.11 His argument for the suggested paradox takes as its point of departure
the likelihood that clinicians in hospitals or care homes will, given the existence
of the DoLS, adopt one of two cautious approaches when patients are admitted.
The purpose of adopting these approaches will be to avoid ‘‘allegations that
individuals may be deprived of their liberty without legal justification.’’12 The
first approach would involve routine assessment of any patients not compulso-
rily detained under the Mental Health Act in order to determine whether they
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possess the capacity to make decisions about staying at or leaving the setting. The
second approach would involve automatic referral of anyone considered to be
deprived of liberty to the relevant authorities in order to gain authorization for
their being kept in the setting. This would be done regardless of whether or not
they possess or fail to possess the relevant decisionmaking capacity.
Shah’s worry is that either of these practices would breach the first of the
Mental Capacity Act’s key principles, that is, the principle requiring healthcare
professionals to presume capacity on the part of their patients. His thought seems
to be that if patients are routinely assessed for decisionmaking capacity, then such
capacity is not being assumed, especially as the Act requires that assessments
only be carried out if there is reason to suppose that capacity may be lacking. If,
on the other hand, patients are automatically referred for authorization of their
stay in the setting under the DoLS, again capacity is not being presumed. This is
because the DoLS apply only to incapacitated patients.
The concerns expressed by Shah are challenged in an article by Peter Lucas,13
who suggests that the first approach—that of routine assessment of capacity—
would not after all be incompatible with the Act’s first principle. To suppose
otherwise is to adopt the peculiar view that, before we can assess a patient’s
capacity, we must already know that she lacks it. That is, if we are required to
presume capacity and to assess capacity is implicitly to assume its lack, then we
cannot assess capacity unless we already know that it is lacking. But, of course,
we could not know of a lack of capacity without first testing for it. The upshot of
this would be that no one could ever legitimately be deemed to lack capacity.
Fortunately, however, at least according to Lucas, the Mental Capacity Act does
not place us in this curious double bind. All that is required to license an
assessment of decisionmaking capacity, according to the Act, is a rationally
justified doubt that the person to be assessed lacks capacity. Certainly, the mere
logical possibility of doubt is not enough legitimately to trigger assessment; there
needs to be positive evidence underlying the doubt. Such evidence, as the Act
says, may be provided by the patient’s behavior or circumstances or by her
having been diagnosed with some condition that affects the operation of her
brain or mind.
Now, this suggests to Lucas a two-stage test for capacity. First, a reasonable
doubt is raised as to whether the patient possesses decisionmaking capacity. The
presence of this doubt triggers the second stage, in which capacity is fully
assessed. Indeed, I think it might be more accurate not to call this a two-stage test,
as the first stage does not really represent part of a test for capacity at all; instead,
it fills a gatekeeping role, determining who will or will not be assessed for
decisionmaking capacity.
Assuming that there is some reason for a person’s being admitted to the
psychiatric ward or care home, that reason is likely to be of the right sort also to
provide a reasonable doubt about someone’s possession of capacity:
All patients potentially falling within the scope of the DoLS will already
have satisfied the first stage of the two-stage test, and will therefore
legitimately be considered under stage two. And while the routine
assessment of these individuals will undoubtedly involve the applica-
tion of a standard different from that which we usually apply in
ordinary life, it is nevertheless warranted, given that they have satisfied
the first-stage test.14
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I suspect that an analogy could be drawn between the picture that Lucas paints
and that of a certain area of legal practice. People are only ever charged with
criminal offenses (we naı¨vely hope, at least!) when there is some reason to doubt
their innocence. Their innocence is then assessed through a legal trial; prior to
and throughout that trial, their innocence is presumed. In just the same way,
a reasonable doubt as to a person’s decisionmaking capacity can trigger an
assessment of that capacity. Nonetheless, at the time that the doubt is raised, and
all through the process of her assessment, her capacity can be presumed.
This does not mean, though, that Lucas finds there to be no inconsistency at all
between the Mental Capacity Act and the DoLS. In fact, he notes that each
operates with a significantly different conception of capacity. These two con-
ceptions, moreover, are mutually incompatible. That is, once a patient has been
found not to possess the capacity to decide whether she ought to stay at a hospital
or care home, that assessment is valid for a substantial amount of time:
A single assessment of capacity is held to be current for up to 28 days
during the initial application for authorisation under the DoLS. Any
subsequent authorisation, based (in part) on such an assessment, may be
valid for up to a year.15
Lucas notes a considerable disparity between this picture of capacity, wherein
lack of capacity is clearly thought of as capable of enduring for not inconsiderable
periods, and the, as he puts it, ‘‘occasionalist’’ model that lies at the heart of the
Act and its associated Code of Practice. He quotes from the Code as follows:
Whenever the term ‘‘person who lacks capacity’’ is used, it means a person
who lacks capacity to make a particular decision or take a particular action
for themselves at the time the decision or action needs to be taken.
As Lucas puts it, then, judgments concerning lack of capacity, as they are
understood in the Act, do not have the ‘‘temporal scope’’ seemingly required of
the same judgments in the DoLS.
The worries expressed by both Shah and Lucas might seem to suggest that the
DoLS need some refinement. It is worth mentioning, however, that Natalie
Banner argues that the standards are not required at all. Between them, she
thinks, the Mental Capacity Act and the existing Mental Health Act are quite
capable of coping legitimately with all situations in which patients are deprived
of their liberty in their best interests:
Where patients are deemed to lack capacity a decision will usually be
taken in their ‘‘best interests’’ under the provisions of the MCA. The
‘‘best interests’’ assessment that occurs in the DoLS procedure is no
different, so it is not clear what the additional DoLS provisions are
intended to add to the clinical decision-making process over and above
those contained within the MCA.16
The ‘‘Occasionalist’’ Model of Capacity and Unwise Decisions
As we have seen, enshrined in the Mental Capacity Act are the beliefs that (1)
capacity is a thoroughly decision-context-dependent affair (that is, occasionalism,
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as Lucas dubs it, is true) and (2) a person can have the capacity to make a certain
type of decision on a particular occasion and yet still choose unwisely on that
occasion. This latter claim ensures that a lack of capacity in a given area of
decisionmaking cannot be straightforwardly inferred from an agent’s making
what might be deemed a poor or eccentric or irrational decision in that area. It is,
as we saw earlier, an essentially antipaternalistic point.
Tim Thornton, however, points out a tension between claims 1 and 2. The
claims, he insists, are not inconsistent, to be sure. They can both be true.
Nonetheless, the way in which we might naturally be tempted to explain the
truth of claim 2 can, he thinks, be shown to be inaccurate. And once that
inaccuracy has been highlighted, we are forced to conclude there are limits ‘‘on
just how atomic our decision specific capacity can be.’’17
Thornton’s arguments are subtle, and at least some familiarity with the work of
the later Wittgenstein is useful if one is fully to grasp them. It is consequently
difficult to do them full justice in a handful of paragraphs. However, the bare
bones of the paper can usefully be set out as follows.
If we are to hold that a person has the capacity to make a particular type of
decision and yet may still, in the exercise of that capacity, choose unwisely, then
a particular picture of capacity is apt to suggest itself to us. That picture ‘‘suggests
a notion of capacity which is distinguished from its outputs,’’ because if the exercise
of capacity ‘‘is not a matter of correct outputs, it must instead be the correct
process.’’18 But if we cleave to an understanding of capacity as a process that can in
principle be both characterized and determined independently of the decisions it
produces, then we may be tempted to hold that that process is grounded in, or
realized by, a mental mechanism. And Thornton wants to hold, on Wittgensteinian
grounds, that the very idea of mental mechanisms that underlie, while remaining
independent of, outputs such as decisions is profoundly flawed. As Wittgenstein
holds, no such mechanism is ever consciously experienced (so introspection cannot
reveal the existence of mental mechanisms), nor does the idea of such a mechanism
have any explanatory power. So,
[b]oth kinds of argument count against the idea of mental mechanisms
and thus count against this way of distinguishing between capacity and
the making of wise decisions.19
The upshot of the failure of the ‘‘mental mechanism’’ model of capacity is that
decisionmaking capacity cannot coherently be characterized independently of
the outputs to which it leads. That, however, does not leave us in the unfortunate
position of being totally unable to countenance the idea of unwise decisions
reached with full decisionmaking capacity. But it does rather thwart any very
robust form of occasionalism:
[T]he distinction between wisdom and capacity is provided by a partial
independence of output from decision making process now construed
without reference to mental mechanisms. Any individual decision could
be unwise. But at the general level, a capacity reflecting ability to weigh
information is an ability generally to make the right decision relative to
the information.20
In other words, we cannot make sense of the thought that a particular decision
might be unwise and yet carried out with capacity, except against a backdrop of
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the agent’s generally being able to reason in ways that produce wise decisions.
Whether this merely ‘‘partial independence of output from decision making
process’’ is sufficiently strong for the purposes of the Mental Capacity Act is
a question which, it seems to me, is worthy of further investigation.
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